The importance of outcome measures is steadily increasing due to the rise of "pay for performance" and the advent of population health. In 2007, a quality initiative was started due to poor performance on rankings such as the University Health Consortium (UHC) report card. Inherent to all such efforts are common challenges: how to engage the providers; how to gather and ensure the accuracy of the data; how to attribute results to individuals; how to ensure permanent improvements. After analysis, a strategy was developed that included an initial focus on 3 metrics (mortality, infection rates, and complications), leadership from practicing neurosurgeons, protocol development and adherence, and subspecialization. In addition, it was decided that the metrics would initially apply to attending physicians only, but that the entire team would need to be involved. Once the fundamental elements were established, the process could be extended to other measures and providers. To support this effort, special information system tools were developed and a support team formed. As the program matured, measured outcomes improved and more metrics were added (to a current total of 48). For example, UHC mortality ratios (observed over expected) decreased by 75%. Infection rates decreased 80%. The program now involves all trainee physicians, advanced practice providers, nurses, and other staff. This paper describes the design, implementation, and results of this effort, and provides a practical guide that may be useful to other groups undertaking similar initiatives.
quality of care and cost have become issues. These concerns accelerated with 2 Institute of Medicine reports that called for reform, specifically citing patient safety as a major problem. [1] [2] [3] [4] These reports elaborated that "better care" should be "safe," "efficient," "effective," "equitable," "evidence-based," "patientcentered," and "timely." [5] [6] [7] The result has been a proliferation of metrics and ratings, often mandated by the federal government. Physicians and hospitals, insurers, and rating agencies have focused strongly on care quality and patient safety, at least as defined by these measures. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] The import of measured outcomes is steadily increasing. "Pay for performance" initiatives (such as "meaningful use of electronic medical systems") may start with a bonus for compliance, but becomes a penalty over time. 13 Medicare has also stated that 90% of all fee-for-service payments will be linked to quality metrics by the end of 2018 (although not defined at the time of the announcement), paving the way toward valuebased compensation systems. 6 Finally, the rise of Accountable Care Organizations and a population health model of delivery puts new emphasis on quality improvements and cost reduction. [14] [15] [16] Most groups have started quality programs, and all physicians are probably involved to some degree, but it is likely that there will be a stronger emphasis on achieving high scores and more rigorous efforts going forward. In October 2007, a new effort was initiated for the Department of Neurosurgery at University of Texas in Houston (UTH) and the Mischer Neuroscience Institute (MNI) at Memorial Hermann Hospital. Both institutions used the University Health Consortium (UHC) as the peer group, and a new leader noted that the performance was poor. For example, neurosurgery mortality ranked 113 out of 119 member hospitals. Infection rates were also high. Already in place was a hospital-led quality program, with administrators deriving and presenting data, which was often contested by physicians. No specific interventions resulted from data and performance had not shown improvement.
It was decided to take a different approach, with a strategy based on physician input and engagement. The immediate aim was to focus on a few key metrics only, and affect outcomes. As the program evolved, additional metrics or goals were to be introduced. Inherent to all such initiatives are common challenges: how to engage the providers; how to gather and ensure the accuracy of the data; how to attribute results to individuals (when patients are cared for as a service); how to ensure permanent improvements that reflected a culture of quality. This paper describes the design, implementation, and results of this effort and provides a practical guide that may be useful to other groups undertaking similar initiatives.
CASE STUDY: MNI/UTH QUALITY PROGRAM Phase 1: Goal Determination and Implementation
The most important first step was to achieve consensus that we wanted to provide the best care, and work toward outstanding results. Inevitable questions arose about the accuracy of external rankings and the meaningfulness of such data. While such questions are legitimate, and such measurements are not perfect, we decided as a group that rankings existed and that we should score well if possible. We also agreed that the most important goal was to improve the overall service, not just focus on improving scores. A very important part of this program was that the leadership comprised practicing neurosurgeons, whose own patients and results were included. The next step involved identifying metrics to track, methods to analyze those data, and mechanisms to affect change. [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] A major obstacle can rise when providers do not believe that quality data are accurate or reflect reality. Further, a profusion of numbers can be confusing and overwhelming, especially for providers who are unfamiliar with such processes. For this program, we decided to focus initially on 3 metrics only: mortality, infection rates, and complications. These data are familiar to all physicians, and the accuracy is difficult to dispute. We could then develop processes to affect results, both as individuals and as a service. In addition, it was decided that the metrics would initially apply to attending physicians only, but that the entire team would need to be involved. Once the fundamental elements were established, the process could be extended to other measures and providers.
Benchmarks Used
UHC data were the primary benchmark for inpatient mortality and subsequently length of stay (LOS). UHC is an alliance of 117 academic medical centers and more than 330 of their affiliated hospitals (representing 90% of the nation's academic medical centers). UHC provides comparative risk-adjusted data and ranks participating members. Risk adjustment theoretically allows for outcomes to be compared among patients with different presentation, acuity, and comorbidities that would influence outcomes (although the validity of this process has not been proven). UHC provides expected values following discharge, allowing the actual result to be expressed as an observed-to-expected (O/E) ratio.
Memorial Hermann submits all inpatient data to UHC on a monthly basis, and standardized data sets include Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG), potentially avoidable complications, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality indicators and comorbidities, as well as administrative data including demographics, diagnoses, procedures, charges, and costs. UHC then analyzes these data, using internal riskadjustment models. Therefore, outcomes are not self-reported and the process probably represents the most rigorous attempt to accurately determine clinical performance.
For infections, the Memorial Hermann Infection Surveillance staff monitors all neuroscience infections affecting neurosurgery patients. National Healthcare Safety Network 48 and Centers for Disease Control standards are used to designate an infection 49 and set benchmarks for comparison.
Complications were tracked and analyzed in traditional morbidity and mortality format, but the number of meetings to discuss complications and service issues were increased to 3 hourly sessions per month. Comparisons to other groups were made using published reports and historical averages. Additional monthly meetings were established specifically to review quality data and discuss care improvement, among leaders only and a meeting involving all providers and staff.
Initial Analysis and Plan
In 2007, mortality was high with more than 1.7 deaths observed for each that was expected (UHC O/E ratios). Was this due to poor care, poor documentation, or both? Both neurosurgery and critical care physicians engaged in a detailed review of representative cases, and it was determined that there were issues on both fronts. With documentation, there was a failure to consistently note "acute factors" or comorbidities that were present on admission (both of which affect risk stratification). Following subarachnoid hemorrhage, for example, the Hunt and Hess grade would be routinely noted, indicating severity of hemorrhage. For the inpatient coding team, however, that scale had no meaning. Using the DRG system, coders relied on acute factors such as "cerebral edema," "coma," "hemiparesis," or "anoxia" to determine severity. Such terms would need to be incorporated into the record when applicable to a patient's condition. Further, comorbidities were often missed when such information was not available at time of initial assessment (which often happens when the presenting patient is critically ill).
It was also determined that approach to care among attending physicians was highly variable, with many areas lacking protocols, or with poor adherence when protocols existed. As clinical services now involve many providers (including trainees, advanced practice providers (APPs), and nurses), with many working in shifts, communication and a coherent approach to each patient becomes more difficult without standardization. Protocols become increasingly important in such situations, and a commitment was made to alter our approach.
For surgical infections, a consulting firm was engaged to observe sterile technique in the operating room. Because frequent deficiencies were noted, an education program involving all personnel was developed. After an initial, intense intervention, recurring refresher sessions were instituted. This was particularly important for the many trainees involved in our operation; new residents arrive yearly, and medical students rotate every few weeks. A separate orientation session was held, administered by neurosurgical nursing staff, for all new trainees and students (in addition to the standard programs provided by the hospital and medical school).
A similar effort ensued in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), with a focus on extraventricular device (EVD) infections (because rates were high). A committee of physicians and nurses was formed to identify deficiencies and propose changes. Strict protocols were instituted regarding placement (mandating specified supervision, draping, and placement techniques). A small group of nurses were educated to become clinical coaches for EVD maintenance and obtaining cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples. Nurses had to be both experienced and coached before they could manipulate EVDs.
Finally, it was decided that subspecialization among attending physicians was required to achieve optimal outcomes. Specialization allows for the development of expertise, and it is particularly important to concentrate experience for technically demanding but less common procedures such as extracranialintracranial (EC-IC) bypasses or peripheral nerve surgery. While difficult to accomplish with an initial neurosurgical staff of 6, a plan was set to structure growth and recruitment around subspecialization. Today, 22 neurosurgeons are organized into subspecialty divisions, each with a leader designated to organize the team, develop and implement protocols, and enhance outcomes. Even among 5 cerebrovascular neurosurgeons, EC-IC bypasses are performed by 1 person.
Our group has also extended neurosurgery to 5 hospitals outside the main medical center. A plan was set that determined what types of patients and levels of acuity could be treated at each location. Currently, spine surgeries are performed at all hospitals, but only 3 locations perform cranial surgery. Only 1 location can treat subarachnoid hemorrhage or multisystem trauma.
Sources and Organization of Data
An ideal information system (IS) should allow for tracking of data important to providers, provide accurate feedback on performance, and become a tool for achieving change and improving results. Electronic medical records (EMR) systems should provide for such an environment, but the reality often falls short. For a quality team, data are often scattered among different systems, making coherent and comprehensive analysis difficult. Like many hospitals, Memorial Hermann organizes and maintains data on several platforms; the inpatient record is based on Cerner Care4 (Cerner, Kansas City, Missouri), except for imaging data which involves General Electric Centricity (General Electric, Fairfield, Connecticut). The billing systems are separate, and the outpatient EMR can be Allscripts (Sandy Springs, Georgia), Logician (Webscape, WebMD, New York, New York), Clinic Care4 (Cerner), or eClinicalWorks (Westborough, Massachusetts) depending on the physician or group. Much work has gone into data integration, with a commitment to move all outpatient EMR toward Clinic Care4 (Cerner; which automatically integrates with the inpatient record); but this process is still incomplete.
Further, the process of changing the EMR is necessarily conservative; alterations in the basic clinical documentation system have significant import, so are only administered by central IS teams after layers of bureaucratic approval. This process is time consuming and does not lend itself to evolution or rapid modification, lessening utility for the practicing physician.
What if we could use the EMR beyond basic data storage and documentation, to help a service operate efficiently? For example, what if we were to put protocol reminders into an EMR and track adherence? What if we specified documentation requirements, such as a list of acute factors whenever a diagnosis was entered? What if the EMR facilitated communication, and sent messages when a study was completed or an intervention was due? Or reminded providers to address required daily functions, like the removal of unnecessary catheters?
It was decided that such capability would be critical to this initiative. Our solution was to install an interface with the main hospital IS called Neurocore (Grand Rapids, Michigan), designed by physicians for physician use. Information flows from the permanent record into Neurocore. Data review and documentation then occurs in Neurocore, and clinical notes then return to the inpatient EMR where it becomes part of the permanent medical record. What happens in the interval, within Neurocore, is outside the main EMR (but within the hospital firewalls, and fully compliant with privacy laws). A major advantage is that changes within Neurocore can be made independent of the hospital IS team (since no changes are made to the hospital system itself ). This allowed easy modification of the interface, by our own programmers, for features that physicians wanted.
For example, new fields can be quickly added or removed when a new protocol was developed or an existing one altered. Similar changes can be made to reminders or mandatory actions. A second advantage is that Neurocore can store and administer data that is not part of the medical record. For example, all complications data can be stored in a separate database within Neurocore, or performance metrics for individuals. Neurocore also facilitate research, gathering data required for a specific project. Neurocore is accessible via any hospital portal, to credentialed providers, in an environment compliant with all privacy regulations. Access to specific databases can be restricted by quality leaders or principal investigators.
Neurocore was designed to collect data entered by the providers at time of service, integrated into the normal flow of patient care. Therefore, the accuracy and acceptance of the data was high. Initial features included the mandatory designation of acute factors with each new diagnosis (from a drop-down list of the correct terms), and time limits for entering mandatory fields. For example, if the past medical history was not completed within 24 h of admission, Neurocore would not allow the next note to be finalized until the information was obtained. Over time, more and more features were added, such as attending attestation statements and enhanced charge capture capabilities. Events such as complications were tracked by the providers in real time.
Implementation took several years and required significant physician involvement and an investment of both time and resources. However, Neurocore was enormously important to the success of this initiative. Neurocore has also become an increasingly important research platform, supporting case and series reviews, clinical trials, and pathophysiological studies. Similar to our approach with the quality program, we believed that research should be integrated into the normal care of our patients. Therefore, all admitted patients are asked to consent for involvement in the "Neurosurgery Research Repository," an Institutional Review Board-approved protocol. Consent allows clinical data, de-identified, to be kept in conjunction with patient's blood, CSF, or tissue samples (such as tumors or aneurysms). The Neurosurgery Research Repository currently holds more than 10,000 patient samples coupled with the entire inpatient record (Figure 1 ).
Needed Staff and Expertise
A robust and effective quality program requires an expert staff. A team was developed that became the Innovation and Quality (IQ) Unit (many of the authors are members of this team). Necessary personnel included statisticians, database managers, programmers, nurses, and coordinators. This team ensured the accuracy and validity of the data, performed analyses, and generated useful reliable reports on a timely basis. This team maintained the interface, developed many useful databases, and ensured regulatory compliance.
Further, this team communicated regularly with the hospital coding team, the revenue cycle team, and other personnel, helping us understand the rules of coding and the strict guidelines set by the federal government (and private insurers). With effective documentation tools in Neurocore, the coding teams became more likely to accurately reflect the patient's actual condition during treatment.
Attribution
Given that neurosurgery often runs as a service, attribution is an issue. When a patient comes in with a critical illness, we have multiple people involved including critical care physicians, trainees, and APPs. For the faculty, we decided that the attending of record is "the captain of the ship" and responsible for everything that happens to that patient. Therefore, a patient's data is attributed to the attending physician.
When the program expanded, attribution became more difficult for those who could not be the attending of record, like trainees, APPs, nurses, and other staff. Residents and fellows had individual metrics, like infections in cases in which they were involved. There were also given service scores for metrics like mortality (an average of attending physician scores based on their rotation). Nursing leaders developed a dashboard for individual nurses, which focused on patient safety and medication reconciliation. But entire units also received monthly scores, which were shared with the nurses on that unit.
For all providers, it became routine to get monthly data, both presented publicly and given individually. All results were identified, and consistency and acceptance of this process was critical to our program.
Phase 2: Expansion of the Program
Despite initial challenges and a period of adjustment, the quality initiative and service reorganization began to produce results. The entire team became comfortable with presenting and discussing data, often identified with individuals' names. It was important for the leadership to be going through the same process, and establish an environment of shared goals and positive reinforcement. Education and support was offered, and it was assumed that everybody was doing their best for patients and wanting to achieve the best results. A focus was also placed on team building and enhancing care processes.
As the program developed, we began to think about expanding the number of metrics and extending data analysis to all personnel, including nurses. For example, LOS, patient satisfaction, and cost would be important areas to follow. Around this time, we noted that salaries for attending physicians were below national benchmarks based on productivity. To enhance and accelerate the quality initiative, the leadership decided to invest in a new bonus program, rather than increase base salaries. Half of this bonus could be earned with results on performance measures such as mortality, LOS, infection rates, and patient satisfaction. The other half could be earned under a new area called "good citizenship." These metrics included ethical behavior, professionalism, regular attendance at meetings, and timely documentation. In essence, they are a standard set of behavioral expectations for all staff. These metrics also included administrative functions such as submitting charges in a timely manner, or meeting meaningful use requirements. These bonuses are significant, representing an average 15% of total compensation. Residents, fellows, and APPs also have a similar bonus plan, including good citizenship. A maximum bonus is an average of 10% of salary.
Patient Satisfaction
Patient satisfaction is sourced from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems survey, a standardized, publicly reported survey of patient views of hospital care. When we began tracking these data, we found that our scores were just below average. Patient satisfaction became part of the physicians' bonus plan, including inpatient and outpatient scores. Individual responses were given to the physicians as feedback. We also started an improvement plan for all clinic staff, which included the call center, front office, and medical assistants, at a total of 18 different clinic locations involving over 100 providers. As with physicians, a bonus plan was started for staff members. Employees have the opportunity to receive up to 7% of their annual salary as a bonus; 3.5% is tied to patient satisfaction and each staff member's clinic has to achieve the 75th percentile or higher. The other 3.5% is tied to clinic operations, encouraging staff to support practice growth and cost management.
LOS, Transfer Denials, and Cost
As the neurosurgery service has grown, we began to experience full occupancy and denials of transfer requests. In 2015, our main medical center had 40 neurological ICU beds, and a total of 120 beds utilized in the hospital. Despite this, there were denials of approximately 800 patients that year. This prompted a significant focus on LOS and bed flow.
One important approach was to increase the number of patients going home to be discharged by noon, reducing LOS, and improving patient flow. We added discharges by noon as a new "good citizenship" metric. Excluded were patients that were being transferred to another facility, since this was not under the physician's control. At inception, home discharges averaged less than 30% before noon. As the physicians began to write discharge orders sooner, it became apparent that the time of discharge from the hospital averaged over 5 h after orders were written. Common reasons for such delay were that patients were not fully informed and had not arranged transportation, or that the nursing staff found the discharge process a lower priority. We instituted a program to plan discharges the evening before, and prepare patients, families, and staff for an early morning exit. The nursing managers added the average time to discharge to the nursing dashboard.
Another initiative was an ICU surveillance routine called "Bed Ahead." Rather than assessing patients and planning for their care in 24-h cycles, we moved to assessment every 4 h (0800-1200-1600-2000-0000-0400). Rounds by the ICU fellow/APP and Charge Nurse would focus on the bed situation, identifying patients that no longer met ICU criteria for transfer, and facilitated patient flow.
LOS is a major determinant of hospitalization cost; we also focused on surgical devices. We noted that the hospital carried more than 10 vendors for spinal implant products. A committee was formed that decided to reduce that number to 2 vendors. In collaboration with hospital executives, competitive bids were requested with a commitment to use the selected products exclusively. This negotiation, the first such partnership between physicians and this hospital system, was highly successful with significant savings and a subsequent 100% compliance rate among neurosurgeons.
THE RESULTS
Over 7 years, the quality program has matured, become increasingly integrated into basic clinical processes, and successfully improved scores in measured outcomes. Protocols were introduced, subspecialization was fostered, and education efforts were initiated. However, improvement in some areas required specific interventions. For example, our clinic patient satisfaction only improved when a staff bonus program was started.
At the same time, our overall service also grew significantly. While quality improvement was not the only factor in practice expansion, it played an important role.
For mortality, O/E rates dropped 75% during this period (Figure 2) . Recently, neurosurgery mortality ranked in the top 10 nationally among UHC institutions (4th). For infections, surgical site infection rates in cranial neurosurgery decreased by 80% (8.22%-0.78%) and in spinal surgery decreased by 90% (14.7%-0.20%). Similar decreases were noted in all tracked categories, from blood stream infection rates to EVDs (Figures 3 and 4) . In the last 12 months, there were virtually no blood stream or EVD infections.
Patient Satisfaction increased from below average to consistent scores around the 90th percentile. Figure 5 shows clinic satisfaction scores before and after introduction of the staff bonus program.
For LOS, total inpatient days decreased by 50% ( Figure 6 ). However, the UHC LOS O/E ratio was unchanged, indicating that most of the unadjusted decrease was the result of a changing mix of patients (Figure 7) . Time from orders being written to actual patient discharge from the hospital decreased from over 5 to 2 h. Currently, 75% of patients going home are discharged by noon. Over 5 years, the average hospitalization cost for a patient undergoing a cervical spine operation dropped 43%, and for a lumber operation 31%. This resulted from a combination of decreased LOS and savings on implant costs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What drove the gains in our quality scores? Some score improvements reflected better patient outcomes, such as decreased infections. However, other gains may reflect better documentation or case mix. For example, UHC mortality rankings rose from 113th to 4th nationally. With an O/E system, this ratio can improve because deaths decrease or the expected mortality increases, with improved documentation affecting risk stratification. Further, case mix may also affect outcome. When one service treats a large volume of patients who are highly unlikely to die, the mortality ratio is likely to be closer to zero. During this period, the neurosurgery service volume quadrupled, with most of the growth seen in elective patients that were not critically ill. The number of neurosurgical cases at the main medical center increased from 1100 to 4500 surgeries, with approximately 7000 surgeries now performed including all locations (Figure 8 ). This increase resulted predominantly from elective referral growth (which enabled our program to go from 11% market share for neurosurgery in Houston in 2007, to a current 35%; see Figure 9 ). We have data that suggest much of the mortality improvement resulted from this growth and change in case mix. However, this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and will be presented in another manuscript. 50 Regardless, we believe that this program has been a success and listed below are lessons that we have learned.
1. At its core, a quality program must reflect the commitment of all providers to achieve the highest performance, not just attempts to improve scores and rankings. We involved all caregivers, and quality processes were embedded into all daily clinical activities. 2. We believe that the leaders of a program must also be the leaders of the quality effort, with their own patients and service involved in the initiative. 3. Most of the initial work involves buy-in and operational implementation, reflecting local personalities, history, and culture. Therefore, a "best practice" cannot just be lifted and copied. In our experience, positive reinforcement, such as bonus programs, was very helpful (although many programs also report success without such measures). 4. We believe that starting small, establishing the fundamental paradigm, and achieving early success was helpful. From a focus on only 3 initial metrics, we now track and affect 48 measures. 5. The accuracy and fairness of data was extremely important.
We started with data that were not in dispute, and ensured that further data collection involved providers. For example, physicians often cannot control LOS when insurance approves a transfer, or no beds are available in a subacute facility. Therefore, we tracked LOS for patients going home separately. Further, adequate IS and staff support was important. 6. Not everything can be measured, and we believe that an overreliance on numbers can be counterproductive. Some of the most important aspects of a service can only be known qualitatively, following review and discussion. Many sessions devoted to careful analyses of individual cases were important both to this effort and the education of our trainees. 7. We believe that persistence and constant effort over a long period were required to achieve permanent changes and develop the desired culture. Such operational initiatives require continuing focus to avoid regression.
The coming changes to US healthcare, from the rise of valuebased payments to population health, will make quality outcomes and performance efficiency increasingly important. [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] We believe that this program has prepared our group to meet the challenges of the future. However, there is more to do. As our focus has been centered on inpatient performance, we are starting 2 initiatives involving long-term outcomes and cost.
Increasingly, we will have to prove the long-term efficacy of our treatment. This can only be done with deployment of accepted, patient-reported outcome measures and integrated inpatient and outpatient EMRs. In 2014, we established a standard set of outcome measures to be completed by all patients, before surgery, and at specified periods afterwards (3, 6 , and 12 months). APPs designate the Modified Rankin and Glasgow Outcome Scores. Tracking long-term outcomes provides information on both the indication for surgery and the safety of surgery. We used an online patient portal, and request that patients fill out self-assessment sections prior to the clinic visit. They can also complete postoperative self-assessments without the need for a clinic visit.
Cost efficiency will also become increasingly important. In our efforts to date, we have focused on LOS and implants. Other major factors include utilization of imaging and pharmaceuticals (including biologics). However, it is difficult to compare cost efficiency between individual physicians. Direct costs have no meaning when subspecialists treat different patient populations. Even for our spine specialists, the types of patients treated and procedures performed are highly variable. Therefore, we are moving toward a statistical sampling approach. We can select specific case categories, such as elective anterior cervical fusions of a single level only, and use that as a marker for overall performance of that physician. By comparing similar surgeries, with enough numbers to average risk, the data begin to reflect performance. Once we can measure long-term efficacy and manage cost, we will be able to participate in both "pay for performance" and population health.
One final point about the support and infrastructure required for such a program. It is true that this effort has required significant resources for implementation, and now incurs substantial ongoing costs. Initially, this mostly involved the dedicated time of existing personnel, from physicians and administrators to the hospital IS team. An outside software consultant was engaged to develop and help implement Neurocore, with a direct cost of several hundreds of thousands of dollars, but large amounts to effort were also required by the hospital IS team to integrate Neurocore into the hospital EMR. Similarly, physicians also dedicated much time and effort to launch and maintain this project. As the program grew, a number of dedicated staff became necessary, to manage the expanding data collection and analytic needs. Our IQ unit was described above: by 2016, the dedicated staff included an informatics and database chief, 2 statisticians, 2 programmers, a full-time complications/mortality and morbidity review manager, and nurses and research assistants for the Neurosurgery Research Repository. The budget for such an effort is substantial, represents the largest component of the ongoing costs, and is probably only feasible for large groups. However, we have found that the value of such spending has been substantial. Improvements in both quality and efficiency have led to better outcomes, higher patient satisfaction, and significant hospital savings with increasing margins. With such results, the rationale for funding for such a program becomes self-evident. Just as importantly, the need to generate and manage data will only increase in the future, as described above. While it would be difficult to propose such a costly program de novo, we have found that starting with a small effort, showing results, having some success, and then expanding has allowed all parties to come on board and realize the value of such an approach. 
